TRNSFERENCE AND OTHER RELATED MENTAL STATES by: RICHARD J.KOSCIEJEW

TRANSFERENCE
AND
OTHER RELATED MENTAL STATES
                    
Introduced by
RICHARD J.KOSCIEJEW
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), is the accredited Austrian physician, neurologist, and founder of psychoanalysis.
 In the late 19th century Viennese neurologist Sigmund Freud developed a theory of personality and a system of psychotherapy known as psychoanalysis. According to this theory, people are strongly influenced by unconscious forces, including innate sexual and aggressive drives. Speaking in the 1938 British Broadcasting Corporation interview, Freud recounts the early resistance to his ideas and later acceptance of his work. Freud’s speech is slurred because he was suffering from cancer of the jaw. He died the following year.
 Freud was born in Freiberg (now Príbor, Czech Republic), on May 6, 1856, and educated at Vienna University. When he was three years old, his family, fleeing from the anti-Semitic riots then raging in Freiberg, moved to Leipzig. Shortly thereafter, the family settled in Vienna, where Freud remained for most of his life.
 Although Freud’s ambition from childhood had been a career in Law, he decided to become a medical student shortly before he entered Vienna University in 1873. Inspired by the scientific investigations of the German poet Goethe, Freud was driven by an intense desire to study natural science and to solve some challenging problems confronting contemporary scientists.
 In his third year at the university Freud began research work on the central nervous system in the physiological laboratory under the direction of the German physician Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke. Neurological research was so engrossing that Freud had overlooked his immediate obligations and passed over the prerequisite studies in which were the prescribed curricula, and as a result, he remained in medical school three years longer than was required normally to qualify as a physician. In 1881, after completing a year of compulsory, military service, he received his medical degree. Unwilling to give up his experimental work, however, he remained at the university as a demonstrator in the physiological laboratory. In 1883, at Brücke’s urging, he reluctantly abandoned theoretical research to gain practical experience.
 Freud spent three years at the General Hospital of Vienna, devoting himself successively to psychiatry, dermatology, and nervous diseases. In 1885, following his appointment as a lecturer in neuropathology at Vienna University, he left his post at the hospital. Later the same year he was awarded a government grant enabling him to spend 19 weeks in Paris as a student of the French neurologist Jean Charcot. Charcot, who was the director of the clinic at the mental hospital, the Salpêtrière, was then treating nervous disorders by using hypnotic suggestion. Freud’s studies under Charcot, which centred largely on hysteria, influenced him greatly in channelling his interests to Psychopathology.
 As the sciences of anatomy and physiology developed in the 19th century, a tendency to interpret all mental phenomena under diseased structure of the brain became apparent in medical circles. At the end of the 19th century, however, the French neurologist Jean Martin Charcot proved that morbid ideas could produce physical manifestations. Subsequently his pupil, the French psychologist Pierre Janet, formulated a description of hysteria as a psychological disorder. Later Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud began to develop the theory that hysterical symptoms are the result of conflict between the social and ethical standards of an individual and an unsuccessfully repressed wish.
 That in which Hysteria, is, and can be accurately considered, as one type of mental illness, and under the stress of mental conflict, anyone may react temporarily with physical symptoms.
 Patients with conversion reactions may have periods of intense emotion and defective power of self-observation. In such a mental condition, patients may interact with others in a bizarre way. Extreme symptoms of dissociation are shown in Dissociative fatigue, in which a person forgets his or her identity and unexpectedly wander, and, perhaps, even wander away from home.
 The ancient Greeks accounted for the instability and mobility of physical symptoms and of attacks of emotional disturbance in women, when these were otherwise unaccountable, by a theory that the womb somehow became transplanted to different positions. This “wandering of the uterus” theory gave the name hysteria (Greek hysteria, “uterus”) to disease phenomena characterized by highly emotional behaviour. During the Middle Ages hysteria was attributed to demonic possession and to witchcraft, which led to persecution.
 As the sciences of anatomy and physiology developed in the 19th century, the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud apparently began to develop the theory that hysterical symptoms are the result of conflict between the social and ethical standards of an individual and an unsuccessfully repressed wish.
 Modern treatment of hysteria consists of some form of psychotherapy and, sometimes, prolonged forms of analytic psychotherapy, or of psychoanalysis. For cases of acute hysteria associated with anxiety, tranquillizing medication may also be necessary
 In conversion reactions, mental conflicts are unconsciously converted to symptoms that seem physical, but no organic cause is found. Common symptoms of conversion reactions include muscular paralysis, blindness, deafness, and tremors. That which emotionally laden mental conflicts appear as physical symptoms, called conversion reactions, or as severe mental dissociation, as the modernity of psychological classification, hysteria is known as solarization disorder or conversion disorder, depending on the specific symptoms displayed. Psychiatric diagnosis of hysteria depends on recognition of a mental conflict and of the unconscious connections between conflict and symptoms. The term mass hysteria is applied to situations in which a large group of people exhibits the same kinds of physical symptoms with no organic cause. For example, one incident of mass hysteria reported in 1977 involved 57 members of a high school marching band who experienced headache, nausea, dizziness, and fainting after a football game. After a fruitless search for organic causes, researchers concluded that a heat reaction among a few band members had spread by emotional suggestion to other members of the band. The term collective stress reaction is now preferred for these situations.
 That, the somatoform disorders are characterized by the presence of physical symptoms that cannot be explained by a medical condition or another mental illness. Thus, physicians often judge that such symptoms result from psychological conflicts or distress. For example, in conversion disorder, also called hysteria, a person may experience blindness, deafness, or seizures, but a physician cannot find anything wrong with the person. People with another somatoform disorder, hypochondriasis, constantly fear that they will develop a serious disease and misinterpret minor physical symptoms as evidence of illness. The term somatoform comes from the Greek word ‘soma’, meaning ‘body’.
 Like the psychosis, neurosis too, is firmly held in psychoanalysis, a mental illness characterized by anxiety and disturbances in one’s personality. People experiencing an emotional crisis due to marital problems, family disputes, problems at work, loneliness, or troubled social relationships may benefit from psychotherapy. People with personality disorders sometimes feel that they can never change their dysfunctional behaviour because they have always acted the same way. Although personality changes are exceedingly difficult, sometimes people can change the most dysfunctional aspects of their feelings and behaviour.
 Therapists use a variety of methods to treat personality disorders, depending on the specific disorder. For example, cognitive and behavioural techniques, such as role playing and logical argument, may help alter a person’s irrational perceptions and assumptions about themselves. Certain psychoactive drugs may help control feelings of anxiety, depression, or severe distortions of thought. Psychotherapy may help people to understand the impact of experiences and relationships during childhood.
 Psychotherapy is usually ineffective for people with antisocial personality disorder because these individuals tend to be manipulative, unreliable, and dishonest with the therapist. Therefore, most mental health professionals favour removing people with this disorder from their current living situation and placing them in a residential treatment centre. Such residential programs strictly supervise patients’ behaviour and impose rigid, consistent rules and responsibilities. These programs appear to help some people, but it is unclear how long their beneficial effects last.
 Therapists treating people with borderline personality disorder sometimes use a technique called dialectical behaviour therapy. In this type of therapy, the therapist initially focuses on reducing suicidal tendencies and other behaviours that disrupt treatment. The therapist then helps the person develop skills to cope with anger and self-destructive impulses. In addition, the person learns to achieve personal strength through an acceptance of the many disappointments and interpersonal conflicts that are a natural part of life. Other problems often treated with psychotherapy include obsessive-compulsive disorder, personality disorders, alcoholism and other forms of drug dependence, problems stemming from child abuse, and behavioural problems, such as eating disorders and juvenile delinquency.
 Mental health professionals do not rely on psychotherapy to treat schizophrenia, a severe mental illness. Drugs are used to treat this disorder. However, some psychotherapeutic techniques may help people with schizophrenia learn appropriate social skills and skills for managing anxiety. Another severe mental illness, bipolar disorder (popularly called manic depression), is treated with drugs or a combination of drugs and psychotherapy.
 Most people who experience episodes of mania also experience spells of severe depression. This pattern of mood swings between mania and depression defined a mental illness known as bipolar disorder, and called manic-depressive illness. In bipolar disorder, episodes of mania usually begin abruptly and last from several weeks to several months. Mild manic episodes can last a year or more. Depression may follow immediately or begin after a period of relatively normal functioning. Manic episodes may require hospitalization because of impaired social behaviour or the presence of psychotic symptoms.
 Mania may result from other conditions besides bipolar disorder. Medical conditions, such as a brain tumour or an overactive thyroid gland, can cause manic symptoms. Certain medications, such as steroids and antidepressants, can also cause mania.
 Generally, only psychologists who follow psychoanalytically or psychodynamics models of abnormal behaviour use the term neurosis. Psychiatrists and psychologists no longer accept the term as a formal diagnosis. Laypersons sometimes use the word neurotic to describe an emotionally unstable person.
 Scottish physician William Cullen coined the term neurosis near the end of the 18th century to describe a variety of nervous behaviours with no apparent physical cause. The Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud and his followers popularized the word in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Freud defined neurosis as one class of mental illnesses. In his view, people became neurotic when their conscious mind repressed inappropriate fantasies of the unconscious mind.
 The unconscious, in psychology, is given to the hypothetical region of the mind containing wishes, memories, fears, feelings, and ideas prevented from expression in conscious awareness. They manifest themselves, instead, by their influence on conscious processes and, most strikingly, by such anomalous phenomena as dreams and neurotic symptoms. Not all mental activity of which the subject is unaware belongs to the unconscious; for example, thoughts that may be made conscious by a new focussing of attention are termed foreconscious or preconscious.
 Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), a German philosopher and educator, and proponents of an idealist theory of reality and moral action, for which Fichte made over to a radically different form, composition, state or disposition the interaction of forces and produced a traditional change, as to make or become different and inversely or producing new things and ideas, proliferating one’s own thoughts and feeling and transformed Kant’s critical idealism into absolute idealism by eliminating Kant’s “things-in-themselves” (external reality) and making the self, or the ego, the ultimate reality. Fichte maintained that the world is created by an absolute ego, which is conscious first of itself and only later of deriving of a conclusion such, in the sense that the state of being different, as in degree, rank or excellence or number of categorical itemizations whose unpassionate disconfirming to priorities of self, leaves something done or merely affected, remaining or the otherness of the world. The human will, a partial manifestation of self, gives human beings freedom to act. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling moved still further toward absolute idealism by construing objects or things as the works of the imagination and Nature as an all-embracing being, spiritual in character. Schelling became the leading philosopher of the movement known as romanticism, which in contrast to the Enlightenment placed its faith in feeling and the creative imagination rather than in reason. The romantic view of the divinity of nature influenced the American transcendentalist movement, led by poet and essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson.
 Fichte was born on May 19, 1762, at Rammenau in Saxony (Sachsen). He was educated at Pforta, Jena, and Leipzig. His anonymously published essay Critique of All Revelation (1792; trans. 1978), at first thought to be a work by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, led to his gaining the chair of philosophy at Jena in 1793. In 1799, however, Fichte was charged with espousing atheism and forced to resign. He continued to write and lecture, and in 1805 he secured the chair of philosophy at Erlangen. In 1810 he became the first rector of the new University of Berlin. During this period the independence of the German states was imperiled by the ambitions of Napoleon, and Fichte fervently expound with or hold briefly the advocacy to provide in response to expressing, involving or characterized seriously as of consequence that in a serious manner, in at least, to a serious extent on or upon sober-mindedness, as in a disposition of a manner of appearance or to the developments adhering to a German national internalization in which the consciousness of, as he died in Berlin on January 27, 1814.
 Fichte's works include The Science of Knowledge (1794; trans. 1970), The Science of Rights (1796; trans. 1869), The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of Knowledge (1798; trans. 1907), The Vocation of Man (1800; trans. 1956), and Addresses to the German Nation (1808; trans. 1922).
 Fichte maintained that philosophy must be a science: It must be developed systematically from a single self-evident proposition, and it must make clear the ground of all experience. Although on the whole he accepted the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, he took exception to Kant's theory of the unknowable “things-in-itself” and to his dichotomy between speculative and practical reason. Fichte held that the ground of all experience is the pure, spontaneous activity of the ego, which can be intellectually intuited in all consciousness. To Fichte the very fact that the ego, the “I,” apprehends its free activity is its self-affirmation, which inevitably brings it into an encounter with the “not-I,” the foreclosing-ego, or otherness. Consciousness is this dynamic encounter between the “I” and the “not-I,” in which the self and the world is interactively defined and realized. Fichte's ethical idealism, with its emphasis on moral will, derived in large part from this conception; his theories had considerable influence on subsequent thought.
 During the period between 1895 and 1900 Freud developed many of the concepts that were later incorporated into psychoanalytic practice and doctrine. Soon after publishing the studies on hysteria he abandoned the use of hypnosis as a cathartic procedure and substituted the investigation of the patient’s spontaneous flow of thoughts, called free association, to reveal the unconscious mental processes at the root of the neurotic disturbance.
 In his clinical observations Freud found evidence for the mental mechanisms of repression and resistance. He described repression as a device operating unconsciously to make the memory of painful or threatening events inaccessible to the conscious mind. Resistance is defined as the unconscious defence against awareness of repressed experiences in order to avoid the resulting anxiety. He traced the operation of unconscious processes, using the free associations of the patient to guide him in the interpretation of dreams and slips of speech. Dream analysis led to his discoveries of infantile sexuality and of the so-called Oedipus complex, which constitutes the erotic attachment of the child for the parent of the opposite sex, together with hostile feelings toward the other parent. In these years he also developed the theory of transference, the processes by which emotional attitudes, established originally toward parental figures in childhood, are transferred in later life to others. The end of this period was marked by the appearance of Freud’s most important work, The Interpretation of Dreams (1899). Here Freud analysed many of his own dreams recorded in the 3-year period of his self-analysis, begun in 1897. This work expounds all the fundamental concepts underlying psychoanalytic technique and doctrine.
 In 1902 Freud was appointed a full professor at Vienna University. This honour was granted not in recognition of his contributions but as a result of the efforts of a highly influential patient. The medical world still regarded his work with hostility, and his next writings, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1904) and Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory (1905), only increased this antagonism. As a result Freud continued to work virtually alone in what he termed “splendid isolation.”
 By 1906, however, a small number of pupils and followers had gathered around Freud, including the Austrian psychiatrists William Stekel and Alfred Adler, the Austrian psychologist Otto Rank, the American psychiatrist Abraham Brill, and the Swiss psychiatrist’s Eugen Bleuler and Carl Jung. Other notable associates, who joined the circle in 1908, were the Hungarian psychiatrist Sándor Ferenczi and the British psychiatrist Ernest Jones.
 The concept of the unconscious was first developed in the periods between the years 1895 and 1900, when Sigmund Freud, theorized that it consists of a surviving feeling experienced during infantile life, including both instinctual drives or libido and their modifications by the development of the superego. According to the Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Jung, the unconscious also consists of a racial unconscious that contains certain inherited, universal, archaic fantasies belonging to what Jung termed the collective unconscious.
 A basic assumption of Freudian theory is that the unconscious conflicts involve instinctual impulses, or drives, that originate in childhood. As these unconscious conflicts are recognized by the patient through analysis, his or her adult mind can find solutions that were unattainable to the immature mind of the child. This depiction of the role of instinctual drives in human life is a unique feature of Freudian theory.
 The scientific development that most affected ethics after the time of Newton was the theory of evolution advanced by Charles Darwin. Darwin's findings provided documentary support for the system, sometimes termed evolutionary ethics, propounded by the British philosopher Herbert Spencer, according to whom morality is merely the result of certain habits acquired by humanity in the course of evolution. A startling but logical elaboration of the Darwinian thesis that survival of the fittest is a basic law of nature was advanced by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who held that so-called moral conduct is necessary only for the weak. Moral conduct - especially such as was advocated in Jewish and Christian ethics, which in his view is a slave ethic - tends to allow the weak to inhibit the self-realization of the strong. According to Nietzsche, every action should be directed toward the development of the superior individual, or Übermensch (“superman”), who will be able to realize the most noble possibilities of life. Nietzsche found this ideal individual best exemplified in the persons of ancient Greek philosophers before Plato and of military dictators such as Julius Caesar and Napoleon.
 In opposition to the concept of ruthless and unremitting struggle as the basic law of nature, the Russian social reformer and philosopher Prince Pyotr Kropotkin, among others, presented studies of animal behavior in nature demonstrating mutual aid. Kropotkin asserted that the survival of species is furthered by mutual aid and that humans have attained primacy among animals in the course of evolution through their capacity for cooperation. Kropotkin expounded his ideas in a number of works, among them Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution (1890-1902) and Ethics, Origin and Development (posthumously published, 1924). In the belief that governments are based on force and that if they are eliminated, the cooperative instincts of people would spontaneously lead to a cooperative order, Kropotkin advocated anarchism.
 Anthropologists applied evolutionary principles to the study of human societies and cultures. These studies reemphasized the different concepts of right and wrong held by different societies; therefore, it was believed, but most such concepts had a relative rather than universal validity. Outstanding among ethical concepts based on an anthropological approach are those of the Finnish anthropologist Edvard A. Westermarck in Ethical Relativity (1932).
 Modern ethics is profoundly affected by the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud and his followers and the behaviorist doctrines based on the conditioned-reflex discoveries of the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov. Freud attributed the problem of good and evil in each individual to the struggle between the drive of the instinctual self to satisfy all its desires and the necessity of the social self to control or repress most of these impulses in order for the individual to function in society. Although Freud's influence has not been assimilated completely into ethical thinking, Freudian depth psychology has shown that guilt, often sexual, underlies much thinking about good and evil.
 Freud’s awareness of the actuality of transference phenomena - that is, of the development in the patient of powerful feelings and wishes toward the therapist learned from Joseph Breuer of the events that occurred in the treatment of Anna O. It was not, however, until the debacle with Dora that the full force of this phenomenon was brought home to him - if not of his own counter-transference feelings as well. Transferences are, Freud said, ‘new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and fantasies aroused and made consciously during the process of the analysis, but they have this peculiarity . . . that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician’ (Freud, 1905) in ‘Psychoanalytic treatment does not create transference, it merely brings them to light like so many other hidden psychical factors’.
 Freud dd not again deal in detail with the subject of transference until 1912, in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’. In fact, the first paper devoted specifically to the subject was Ferenczi’s ‘Introjection and Transference’ published in 1909. Fereneci offered an exposition of the topic, drawing its stimulus from Freud’s reference to ‘transference’, in The Interpretation of Dreams about the Dora case. Transference, he shares, is a special case of the mechanism of displacement, is ubiquitous in life but especially pronounced in neurotics, and makes its most explicit appearance in the relationship of patient to the analyst - in or outside the psychoanalysis. He relates the transference to other psychic mechanisms, most particularly projection and introjection, and defends the psychoanalysis against accusations of improperly generating transference reactions in its patients. ‘The critics who look on these transferences as dangerous should’, he says, ‘condemn the non-analytic modes of treatment more severely than the psychoanalytic method, since the former really intensifies the transference, while the latter strive to uncover and to resolve them when possible.
 It was not until 1912, in The Dynamics of Transference; that Freud returned to the subject, in explaining, about libido economy and, while the topographic model of the mind the inevitable emergence of the transference in the analytic situation and its role as a primary mode of resistence; The transference idea has penetrated into consciousness in front of any other possible association because it satisfies the resistance’ - but only if it is a negative, or erotic transference. The analyst’s role is to ‘control’ or ‘remove’ the transference resistance. ‘It is’ Freud says, ‘on th at field that the victory must be won’.
 None of Freud’s epochal discoveries - the power of the dynamic unconscious, the meaningfulness of the dream, the universality of intrapsychic conflict, the critical role of repression, the phenomena of infantile sexuality - has been more heuristically productive or more clinically valuable than his demonstration that humans regularly and inevitably repeat with the analyst and with other important figures in their current live pasterns of relationship, of fantasy, and of conflict with the crucial figures in their childhood - primarily their parents.
 The transference has become a sort of projective device, a vessel into which each commentators pour the essence of his or her approach to the clinical situation and to the understanding of that unique immuration process that makes up the analytic situation. The initial combinality (1909-36) that of the pioneers, marches the efforts of Freud and his early followers to grasp and to deal with the powerful phenomenon they were only beginning to recognize and to attempt to understand. The middle period (1936-60) reflects the consolidation of therapeutic technique and the attempt of both European and American analysts to bring the idea of transference into consonance with the increasingly important constructs of ego psychology. In the latest of periods (1960-87), we find a balance between reassertion of traditional views and various revisionist statements and reconsiderations of some classical position.
 The productivity of the neurosis (during a course of psychoanalytic treatment) is far from being extinguished, but exercises itself in the creation of a peculiar sort of thought-formation, mostly unconscious, to which the name ‘transference’ may be given.
 Despite radical implications for which theory has presented of psychoanalytic techniques and others of the  dialectically discoursing involvement, is often without awareness. Where these psychoanalysts disagree in their conceptual reprehended frame of reference, creating the recognitions that the analyst and the patient cannot simply avoid having an impact upon one-another. Even so, that it cannot be removed, by that obstructions form whether we have related this to our deliberate technological interventions or intentional aspects as drawn on or upon the conceptual interactions. As for reasons that are useful and necessary to distinguish between theory of technological analysis, with which interconnectivity can be established through the conjunctive relationships having in relations of what seems allowable for us to expand our knowledge of the complex and subtle factors that account for therapeutic action. This, however, can ultimately become the most effective fight for regaining and developing our understanding of how best to serve ourselves to advance the analytic situation and too aculeate more profound and very acute satisfactions, as depictions in the psychoanalytic encounter, no matter whatever our accountable resultants may be of our therapeutical orientations.
 An appreciation of its power of interactive forces addressed in the analytic fields of thought, not only challenges many traditionally held beliefs about the hidden natures of therapeutic actions. However, these take upon the requirement for us to recognize and acknowledge the untenability of the traditional view that analysts can be an object source in the works. They have better to understand it, for example, where patients’ and the analysts may express as a quality that which the analyst is in a possibility of a position to an objective interpreter of the patient’s experiential process. That in this may reflect a form of ‘collusive enactment’ and a convergence of need of both the analyst and the patient so see that the analyst as the authoritarian. If the patient and analyst submit to needs to believe that the analyst is the omniscient other or the benevolent authority, to which one can entrust one’s self-sufficiency, that in having to antecedent cause, is that of existing of itself that is itself self-existent.
 As the foundational structure of the relationship might serve to obscure the acknowledging fact that it is involved to encourage the belief that, as one may say, that wherever a coordinate system is complicating and hardness to its plexuities, that its complexity has of recognizing of the mind, such that the immediate ‘indeterminacy’ arises, not necessarily because of some conditional unobtainability, but holds accountably to subjective matters that grow stronger in gathering the right prediction, least of mention, that of many things that are yet to be known. Such that th e stray consequences of studying them will disturb the status quo, and of not-knowing to what influential persuasions do really occur between the protective anatomy, therefore, that our manifesting of awareness cannot accord with the inclinations tat are beheld to what is meant in how. History, is not and cannot be determinate. Thus, the supposed causes may only produce the consequences we expect, this has rarely been more true of those whose thoughts and interactions in psychoanalytic interpretations but the interrelatedness is a way that no dramatist would dare to conceive.
 In Winnicott (1969) has noted that there are times when ‘analyser’ can serve as holding operations and become interminable without any real growth occurring.
 An attractive perspective helps to clarify ‘why’ sometimes the analyser ‘abstinence’ carries as much risk of negative iatrogenic consequences as carrying out active intervention. Although silence at times obviously can be respectful and facilitating, and yet, at times it can be cruel and sadistic, or it can be based on a fear of engagement, among a host of possible other meanings and equally attributive to distributional dynamic functions.
 A strong appreciation of interacted factors also allow us to consider that whatever degree the patient’s perceptions of the analyst are plausible and even valid (Ferenczi 1933, Little 1951, Levenson 1973, Searles 1975, Gill 1982, and Hoffman 1983). This may be due to the patient’s expertise upon the stimulating precessions to this kind of responsiveness in the analyst. The reverse is true as well, although the patient and the analyst each will have some unique vulnerabilities, sensitivities, strengths, and needs, such that we must consider ‘why’ such peculiarities have elated the particular qualities or sensibilities of either patient or the analyst at a given moment and not at others. At any moment the patient that of the analyst might be involved in some kind of collusive enactment (Racker 1957, 1959, Grotstein 1981, and McDougall 1979), they have held that their considerations explain of reasons that posit themselves of why clinicians often seem to practice in ways that contradict their own shared beliefs and therapeutic positions, least of mention, principles by way of enacting to some unfiltered dialectic discourse.
 Yet, these differences, which occur within and between the diverse analytic traditions, are that an interactive view of the analytic field has some theoretical and technological implications that bridge all psychoanalytic perceptivity, which each among us cannot ignore. Its premise lies in the fact that we recognize and do acknowledge that the analyst and patient cannot simply avoid having an impact on each other, even if both analyst and the patient are totally silent, requiring that we realize that even if a treatment is productive or successful, we cannot be clear of whether they have related this to our deliberated technological interventions or to aspects of the interaction that has eluded our awareness.
 Psychoanalysts’ of diverse orientations increasingly have come to recognize is that the patient and the analysts are continually persuasive and being influenced by each other in a dialectic way, and often without awareness. This has radical implication for abstractive  views as drawn on or upon psychoanalytic technique. Where their psychoanalytic philosophes disagree are comprised in the conception of what the specific implications of an interactive view of the analytic fields of thought that it might characterize.
 It is, therefore, that distinguishing between its theoretical  technique, which is useful and necessary, that relates to what we do with awareness and intention, as a theory of a theoretical action that deals in the accompaniment of our manifesting health and wholeness, that the psychoanalytic interaction has itself, that whether or not is to evolve from our technical and mechanistic forms of technique. The recognition as such, can allow us to expand our knowledge of the complications as set in the complex subtler factors that account for the therapeutic action. This, nonetheless, can ultimately become the most effective basis as a reason or justification for an action or option. That for refining and developing our understanding of how  best to use ourselves to advance the analytic work and to simplify more profound and incisive kinds of psychoanalytic engagement, no matter what our therapeutic orientation.
 An appreciation for which the power of interactive forces in the analytic subject field, not only challenges many traditionally held beliefs about the hidden dimensions through which times have hidden the nature of therapeutic action, but also requiring us to acknowledge and to recognize the untenability assembling on or upon the relational view that the analyst can be an objective participant in the work? It also helps us to grasp the extent upon which they  are presupposed therapeutic interpretations, for example, can be ways of harassing, demeaning, patronizing, impinging on, penetrating or violating the patient, or the particular ways of gratifying, supporting, complying, among several other possibilities. Where the patient and analysts assume that the analyst can be an objective interpreter of the patient’s experience, this may factually reflect a form of collusive enactment and a convergence of the needs, whereof both analyst and the patient can see the analyst as an authoritarian. If the patient and the analyst have needs to believe that the analyst is the omniscient other or the benevolent authority to which one can entrust in one’s favour. The foundational structure of the relationship might serve to obscure recognition of the fact that they are enacting such a drama. In this regard, Winnicott (1969) has marked and noted that, at that point are times when the analyses can serve as holding operations and become interminable, without any real growth occurring.
 The contentual meaning of the patient’s free association also has to be reconsidered from an interactive apprehension. Usually viewed as the medium of analytic work, as for free association that may, at times be a profound frame of resistance, and to avoid, rather than engage in the analytic process. Alternative measures can reflect with a form of compliance or collusion, for being aware and affected by conscious or  insensible of emotion or passion the unconsciousness, from which is held within the analyst’s needs, fears, and resistance.
 Yet, the ongoing dialectic discourse of transference and its place in analytic theory and technique, was during the periods of the middle 1936 and 1960, where this period was to relate its phenomenology to the growing understanding of the ‘ego’, both on its defensive and in Hartmann’s terms, ‘autonomous aspects’, to new theories of early development and a growing concern in some quarters with ‘interpersonal’ as opposed too purely ‘intrapsychic’ aspects of personality function. A further stimulus was Alexander’s (1946) advocacy of active role playing by the analyst to send the patient a ‘corrective emotional experience’, at least, in psychoanalytic psychotherapy if not in analysis proper.
 In her very practically orientated paper, Greenacre emphasizes the distinction, first shared by Freud, between the analytic transference and that which characterizes other modes of therapy. All manipulation, exploitation, all use of transference for ‘corrective emotional experience’, is excluded from the psychoanalytic situation, which relies exclusively on interpretation to achieve its therapeutic goal. Greenacre‘s view of the analyst’s role in analysis and in the world outside in a relatively austere one: She would preclude the analyst from publically participating in social or political activities that might tend to reveal aspects of the analyst’s person that would contaminate the transference. Like Freud, Stone, and others she distinguishes between ‘basic’, essentially nonconflictual transference derived from the early mother-child relationship and the analytic transference proper, which involves projection (for example, Brenner) challenge this distinction.
 It is, however, echoed in Elizabeth Zetzel’s masterful review of what were, at the time of writing, the dominant trends in the field. She proposed, following the usage of Edward Bibring, the idea of the ‘therapeutic alliance’, derived, as was Greenacre’s basic transference, from the positive aspects of the mother-child relationship. Like nearly all other commentators she asserted the centrality of transference interpretation in the analytic process, but she outlines in sharp detail some differences in form and content of such interpretations between Freudian and Klemian analysis - that is, between those who are concerned with the role of the ego and the analysis of defence and those who emphasize the importance of early object relations and primitive instinctual fantasy.
 Like Greenacre and Zetzel, Greenson distinguishes between what he calls the ‘working alliance’ and the ‘transference neurosis’. He contends that without the development of the working alliance the transference cannot be analysed effectively. The ‘working alliance’ depends not only on the patient’s capacity to establish adequate object ties and to assess reality. Nevertheless, is that, also on the analyst’s assumption of an attitude that permits such an alliance to emerge. Thus, Greenson advocates an analytic stance that, which of the adhering to the rule of abstinence, allows for more ‘realistic’ gratification and a less austere stance than Greenacre would encourage. Greenson’s definition of transference - that in any case or without exception it always represents a repetition of experience and that it is always ‘inappropriate to the present’ - will later be challenged by Gill, who contends that transference reactions may be appropriate responses to aspects of the psychoanalytic situation of which both patient and analyst is not necessarily aware.
 It is, only to mention, that, at the outset, that resistance is, in certain foundational reference, an operational equivalence of defence, its scope is really far larger and more complicated. The thought of its nature and motivation on grounds that resistance in the psychoanalytic process, in using a variety of mechanisms that defy classification in the ways that genetically determine defences derived from important and common developmental progressions, as having a particular direction and character for having a growing tendency to underestimate the potential or strength of that notion, then it may be classified. From falling asleep to a brilliant argument there is a limitless mobility of developmental devices with which the patient may protect the current integration of his personality, including his system of permanent defences. In fact, resistance of a surface, for which a consciously related individual character and educationally cultural background, when presented of itself, are the patient’s first confrontations with a unique and as often puzzling treatment of methodological analysis. While some of these phenomena are continuous with deeper resistance, a closer and perhaps, balanced equilibrium held in bondage to some forming mutuality within the continuity that we must meet, for which of others, are at their own level. All the same, it now leaves to a greater extent, the much neglected faculty of informed and reflective common sense, such that to a lesser extent as readily accessible and explicable dynamism that inevitably supervenes in the analytic work, evens though the surface resistance have been largely or wholly mastered. Its submissive providence lay order to a perfect commonality. This, premising with which is the specific type in influence to the immediacy in cultural climatically stressed of the general attitude of many young people (Anna Freud 1968) toward the psychoanalytic process and its goals.
 However, an important factor responsible for the neglect of the theory of transference was the early preoccupation of analysis with showing the various mechanisms involved in transference. Interest in the genesis of transference was sidetracked by focussing research on the manifestations of resistance and the mechanisms of defence. These mechanisms are often explained the phenomenon of transference, and their operation was taken to explain its nature and occurrence.
 What is more, is that, the neglect of this subject may in part be the result of the personal anxieties of analysts. Edward Glover comments on the absence of open discussion about psychoanalytic technique, and considers the possibility of subjective anxieties: . . .’this seems more likely in that so much technical discussion centres round the phenomena of transference and counter-transference, both positive and negative. There may in addition enter it an unconscious endeavour to avoid any active ‘interference’ or, more exactly, to remove any suspicion of methods reminiscent of the hypnotist.
 That is saying, that there is no consensus about the use of the term ‘transference’ which is called variously ‘the transference’, ‘a transference’, ‘transferences’, ‘transference state’ and sometimes as ‘analytical rapport’.
 Does transference embrace the whole affective relationship between an analyst and the patient, or the more restricted ‘neurotic transference’ manifestation? Freud used the term in both senses. To this fact, Silversberg recently drew attention to, and argued that transference should be limited to ‘irrational’ manifestations, maintaining that if the patient says ‘good morning’ to his analyst including such behaviour under the term transference is unreasonable. The contrary view is also expressed: That transference, after the opening stage, is every where, and the patient’s every action can be given a transference interpretation.
 Can transference be adjusted to reality, or are transference and reality mutually exclusive, so that some action can only be either the one or the other, or can they coexist so that behaviour in accord with reality can be given a transference meaning as in forced transference interpretations? Alexander comes to the conclusion that they are, . . . truly mutually exclusive, just as the more general concept ‘neurosis’ is quite incompatible with that of reality adjusted behaviour.
 Our next query arises from one special aspect of transference, that of ‘acting out‘ in analysis. Freud introduced the term ‘repetition compulsion’ and he says, ‘during a patient in analysis . . .  it is plain that the compulsion too repeated in analysis the occurrence of his infantile life disregards in every way the pleasure principle’. In a comprehensive critical survey of the subject, Kubie comes to the conclusion that the whole conception of a compulsion to repeat for the sake of repetition is of questionable value as a scientific idea, and were better eliminated. He believes the conception if a ‘repetition compulsion’ involves the disputed death instinct, and that the term is used in psychoanalytic literature with such widely differing connotations that it has lost most, if not all, of its original meaning. Freud introduced the term for the one variety of transference reaction called ‘acting out’, but it is, in fact, applied to all transference manifestations. Anna Freud, defines transference as,‘ . . . all those impulses experienced by the patient in his relation with the analyst that are not newly created by the objective analytic situation but have their sources in early . . .  relations and are now merely revived under the influence of the repetition compulsion. Ought, then, the term ‘repetition compulsion’ be rejected or retained and, if retained, is it applicable to all transference reactions, or to acting out only?
 This leads to the question of whether transference manifestations are essentially neurotic, as Freud most often maintains: ‘The striking peculiarity of neurotic to develop affectionately and hostile feelings toward their analyst are called ‘transference’. Other authors, however, treat transference as an example of the mechanism of displacement, and hold it to be a ‘normal’ mechanism. Abraham considers a capacity for transference identical with a capacity for adaptation that is ‘sublimated sexual; transference’, and he believes that the sexual impulse in the neurotic is distinguishable from the normal only by as excessive strength. Glover states: ‘Accessibility to human influence depends on the patient’s capacity to establish transference, i.e., to repeat in current situations  . . . altitudes develop in early family life’. Is transference, then, a consequent to trauma, conflict and repression, and so exclusively neurotic, or is it normal?
 In answer to the question, is transference rational or irrational, Silverberg maintains that transference should be defined as something having the two essential qualities that it be ‘irrational and disagreeable to the patient’. Fenichel agrees that transference is bound up with the fact that a person does not react rationally to the influence of the outer world’. Evidently, no advantage or clarification of the term ‘transference’ has followed its assessment as ‘rational’ or otherwise. Unfortunately, the antithesis, ‘rational’ versus ‘irrational’, was introduced, as it was  precisely the psychoanalysis that explained that rational behaviour can be traced to ‘irrational’ roots. What is transferred? : Affects, emotions, ideas, conflicts, attitudes, experiences? Freud says only effect of love and hate is included; but Glover finds that ‘Up to date (1937) discussion of transference was influenced for the most part by the understanding of one unconscious mechanism only, that of displacement, and he concludes that an adequate conception of transference must reflect all the individuals’ development  . . . , . He displaces onto the analyst, not merely affects and ideas but all he has ever learned or forgotten throughout his mental development. Are these transferred to the person of the analyst, or also to the analytic situation, is extra-analytic behaviour to be classed as transference?
 Our positive and negative transference felt by the analyst to be an intrusive foreign body, as Anna Freud states in discussing the   transference of libidinal impulses, or are they agreeable to the patient’s, a gratification as great that they serve as resistance: Alexander concludes that transference gratifications are the greatest source of unduly prolonging analysis, he reminds us that whereas Freud initially had the greatest difficulty in persuading his patients to continue analysis, he soon had equally greater difficulty in persuading them to give up.
 Freud divides positive transference into sympathetic and positive transferences, as the relation between the two is not clearly defined, and sympathetic, or remain distinct, is sympathetic transference resolved with positive and negative transference? Debates concerning the importance of positive transference at the beginning of analysis and carrier of the whole analysis have largely been revived among child analyses. As this has extended to the question of whether or not a transference neurosis in children is desirable or even possible. While this dispute touches on the fundament of psychoanalytic theory, the definitions offered as a basis for the discussion are not very precise.
 In the face of such divergent opinions on the hidden nature and manifestations of transference, one might expect several hypotheses and opinions about how these manifestations come about. Nevertheless, this is not so. On the contrary, there is the earliest approach to full unanimity and accord throughout the psychoanalytic literature on this point. Transference manifestations are held to arise within the patient’s spontaneously. ‘This peculiarity of the transference is not, therefore, says Freud, ‘to be placed to the account of psychoanalysis treatment, but is to be ascribed to the patient’s neurosis itself’. Elsewhere he states, ‘In every analytic treatment the patient develops, without any activity by the analyst, an intense affective relation to him . . . It must not be assumed the analysis produces the transference  . . . , . The psychoanalytic treatment does not produce the transference, it only unmasks it’. Ferenczi, in discussing the positive and negative transference says: ‘ . . . and it has particularly to be stressed that this process is the patient’s own work and is hardly ever produced by the analyst’. Analytical transference appears spontaneously; the analysts need only take care not to disturb this process. Rado states, ‘The analysis did not deliberately set out to affect this new artificial formation [the transference neurosis]: He merely observed that such a process took place and forthwith made use of it for his own purpose’. Freud further states, ‘The fact of the transference appearing, although neither wanted nor induced by either the analyst or the patient, in every neurotic who comes under treatment . . . has always seemed to me . . . proof that the source of the propelling forces of neurosis lies in the sexual life.
 There is, however, a reference by Freud from which one has to infer that he had in mind another factor in the genesis of transference apart from spontaneity - in fact, some outside influence: The analyst ‘must recognize that the patient’s falling in love is induced by the analytic situation . . .’ He [the analyst] has evoked this love by undertaking analytic treatment to cure the neurosis, for him, it is an unavoidable consequence of a medical situation . . . Freud did not amplify or specify what importance he attached to this causal remark.
 Anna Freud states that the children’s analysis has to woe the little patient to gain its love and affection before analysis can go on, and she says, parenthetically, that something similar takes place in the analysis of adults.
 Another reference to the effect those transference phenomenons are not completely spontaneous is found in as statement by Glover, summarizing the effects of inexact interpretation. He says that the artificial phobic and hysterical formation resulting from incomplete or inexact interpretations is not an entirely new conception. Hypnotic manifestations had long been considered as induced hysteria and Abraham considered that states of autosuggestions were induced obsessional systems. He continues, ‘ . . .  and, of course, the induction or development of a transference neurosis during analysis is regarded as an integral part of the process’. One is entitled from the context to assume that Glover commits himself to the view that some outside factors are operative which induce the transference neurosis. Still, it is hardly a coincidence that it is no more than a hint.
 A few remarks about clinical considerations are the transference neurosis, and the problem of transference interpretation, may be offered at this point. The whole situational structure of analysis (in contrast with other personal relationships), its dialogue of free association and interpretation, and its deprivations too most ordinary cognitive and emotions’ interpersonal striving tends toward the separation of discrete transferences from their synthesis with one another and with defences, in character or symptoms, and with deepening regression, toward the re-enactment of the essentials of the infantile neurosis, in the transference neurosis. In other relationships, the ‘exchange of ideas’ expression - gratifying, aggressive, punitive or otherwise is actively responsive, and the open mobility of search for alternative  or greater satisfaction - exert a profound dynamic and economic influence, so that only extraordinary situations, or transference of pathological character, or both, occasion comparable regression.
 If we, in considering the function of the transference in the analytical process, one is confronted by the apparent naïve, but nonetheless important question of the role of the actual (current) objects as compared with that of the object representation of the original personage in the past. We recall Freud’s paradoxical, somewhat gloomy, but portentous concluding passage in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’. This struggle between the doctor and the patient, between intellect and instinctual life, between understanding and seeking to act, is played out almost exclusively in the phenomenon of transference. It is on that field that the victory must be won - the victory whose expression is the permanent cure of the neurosis. It cannot be disputed that controlling the phenomena of transference presents the psycho-analysis with the greatest difficulties. However, it should be forgotten that they do us the inestimable service of making the patient’s hidden and forgotten erotic impulses immediate and manifest. For when all is said and done, destroying anyone in the absentia is impossible or in effigy.
 Both object and representations are made necessary by the basic phenomenon of original separation. Even so, the existence of an image of the object, which persists without that object, is one important beginning of psychic life overall, certainly an indispensable prerequisite for object relationship, as generally considered. Whether this is viewed as (or at times demonstrable is) an unstable introjects, which is always subject to alternative projection, or an intrapsychic object representation clearly distinguished from the self representation, or a firm identification in the superego, or in the ego itself, these phenomena are in various ways components of the system of mastery of the fact of separation, or separateness, from the originally absolutely necessary anaclitic or (in the earliest period) symbiotic ‘object’. In the light of clinical observation, it may be the relative stable (parental) object representation, at times drawing to varying degree on the more archaic phenomena, at moments, even in nonpsychotic patients, overwhelmed by them, sometimes a restoration from oedipal identification, which provides the preponderant basis for most demonstrable analytic transference, in neurotic patients. The transference is effectively established when this representation invests the analyst to a degree - depending on intensity of drive and mode of ego participation - which ranges from wishing and striving to remake the analyst, to biassed judgments and misinterpretations of data, finally in actual perceptual distortion.
 However, richly and vividly the old object representation as such may be invested, however rigidly established the libidinal or aggressive cathexis if the image may be, his as such can become the actual and exclusive focus of full instinctual discharge, or of complicated and intense instinct-defence solution, only in states of extreme pathological severity. This is consistent with the usual and general energy-sparing quality of strictly intrapsychic processes. For the vast majority of persons, viable to a degree, including those with severe neurosis, character distortions, addictions, and certain psychoses, the striving is toward the living and actual object, even at the expense of intense suffering. In a sense, this returns us to the beginning, to the state in which th e psychological ‘object-to-be’ (if you prefer) has a critical importance never to be duplicated but in certain acute life emergence, even if the object is not firmly perceived as such, in the sense of later object relations. It does seem those trace impressions from the realistic contacts in the service of life preserving, and the associated instinctual gratifications, and innumerable secondarily associated sensory impressions, are vaster by the specific inborn urges of sexual maturation. There propels the individual to renew many earliest modes of actual bodily contact, about seeking specific instinctual gratification, or, to look away from clear-out instinctual matters to the more remote elaborations of human contact: Few regard loneliness as other than a source of suffering, even self-imposed, as an apparent matter of choice, and the forcible position of ‘solitary confinements’ is surely one of the most cruel of punishment.
 Interpretation, recollection or reconstruction, and, of course, working through, is essential for the establishment of effective insight, but they cannot operate mutatively if applied only to memories of the strict sense, whether of highly cathected events or persons. For it is the thrust of wish or impulse or the elaboration of germane dynamic fantasies, and the corresponding defensive structure and their inadequacies, associated with such memories, which produce neurosis. It is a parallel thrust that creates the transference neurosis. Where memories are clear and vivid, through recall, or accepted as much through reconstruction, and associated with variable, optional, and adaptive, rather than rigidly ‘structuralized’ response patterns, the analytic work has been done.
 This view does place somewhat heavy than usual emphasis on the horizontal coordinate of operations, the conscious and unconscious relation to the analyst as a living and actual object, who becomes invested with the imagery, traits, and functions of critical objects of the past. The relationship is to be understood in its dynamic, economic, and adaptive meanings, in its current ‘structuralized’ tenacity, the real and unreal carefully separated from one another. The process of subjective memory or of reconstruction, the indispensable genetic dimension, is, in this sense, invoked toward the decisive and specific autobiographic understanding of the living version of old conflict, rather than with the assumption that the interpretative reduction of the transference neurosis to gross mnemic elements is, in itself and automatically, mutative. At least, this of the problem seems appropriate to most chronic neurosis embedded in germane character structure of some Plexuity. That neurotic symptoms connected with isolated traumatic events, covering indisputably true, although the details of process, including the role of transference, are probably  not yet adequately understood. Psychoanalysis was born in the observation of this type of process. Nonetheless, for some time, the role of the transference, in the early writings of both Freud and Ferenczi, seemed weighted somewhat in the direction of its resistance function (i.e., as directed against recall), although its affirmative functions were soon adequately appreciated, and placed in the dialectical position, which has obtained with time.
 However, even if it is insufficient for exclusive reliance, in relation to the complicated neurotic problems faced, assigning it to the recall and reconstruction of the past an exclusively explanatory value would be fallacious (in the intellectual sense), important though that functions be, and difficult as its full-blown emotional correlate may be to come by. There is no doubt that, even in complicated neuroses, with equivalently complicated transference neuroses, the genuinely experienced linking of the past and present can have, at times, a certain uniquely specific dynamic effect of its own, a type of telescoping or merging of common elements in experience, which must be connected with the meaninglessness of time in unconscious life, compared with its stern authority in the life of consciousness and adaptation to everyday reality. Contributing decisively to such experience, to whatever degree it occurs, is of course, the vivid currency of thee transference neurosis, and central in this, the reincarnation of old objects in an actual person, the analyst.
 Thus, an allied problem in the general sphere of transference is the fascinating and often enigmatic interplay of past and present. If one wishes to view this interplay as to a stereotyped formulation, the matter can remain relatively uncomplicated - as a formulation. Unfortunately, this is too often the case. The phenomenon, however, retains some important obscurities, which cannot thoroughly be to dispel, but to which would be to call of its attention. To concentrate on the dimension of time, only to omit reference to the many complicated and intermediate aspects of technique, is, however essential. For example, we can assume that the transference neurosis re-enacts the essential conflicts of the infantile neurosis in a current setting. If a reasonable degree of awareness of transference is established, the next problem is the genetic reduction of the necrosis to its elements in the past, through analysis of the transference resistance and allied intrapsychic remittances, ultimately genetic interpretations, recollection and reconstruction, and working through. As the transference is related to its genetic origins, the analyst by that emerges in his true, i.e., real, identity to the patient, the transference is putatively ‘resolved’. To the extent that one follows the traditional view that all remittances, including the transference itself, is ultimately directed against the restoration of early memories as such, this is a convincing formulation. Yet, in its own right, it has a certain tightly logical quality. However, we know that all this is not so readily accomplished, apart from the special intrapsychic considerations described by Freud in ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’. Although in some favourable cases, much of the cognitive interpretative work can be accomplished, there remains the fact that cognition alone, in its bare sense, does not necessarily lead to the subsidence of powerful dynamics, to the withdrawal of ‘cathexes’ from important real objects. For, a short while ago, the analyst is a real and living object, apart from the representations with which the transference invests him, which agree interpretably as such. There is, and not as seldom, as for a confusing interrelation and commingling of the emergent responses due to an old seeking, and those directed toward a new individual in his own right. Both are important, furthermore, there are large and important zones of overlapping. Apart from such considerations, even the explicitly incestuous transference is currently experienced (at least in good part) by a full-grown adult (like the original Oedipus), instead of a totally and actually a helpless child. To be sure, the latter state is reflected subjectively in the emergent transference elements of instinctual striving: But it is subject to analysis, and the residue is something significantly, if not totally, different. It is these as such, which, must be displaced to others. If, as generally agreed, the revival of infantile fantasies and striving in the biologically mature adolescent. This presents a new and special problem, one must assume distinctiveness of experience for the adult, although it is true that in the majority of instances, adequate solution is favoured by the effected state. There is, in any case, a residual real relationship between persons who have worked together in a prolonged, arduous, and intimate relationship, which, strictly speaking, is not a transference, but there may be mutual colouration, blending, and some confusion between the two spheres of feeling. The general tendency is, such as to ignore this dual aspect, in continuing relationships, probably both components are gratified to some degree. Above all, there is the ubiquitous power of the residual primordial transference, the urge to cling to an omnipotent parent, to resist the displacement of its ‘sublimated’ analytic aspects, even if the various representations of the wishes for bodily intimacy have been thoroughly analysed and successfully displaced. The outcome is largely the ‘transference of the transference’. For example, reality can provide no actual answer to the man of faith finds this gratification in revealed religion, others in a wide range of secular beliefs and ‘leaders’, the modern rational and sceptical intellectual is less fortunate in this respect. Presumably free, he is prone to invest even intellectual disciplines or their proponents with inappropriate expectations and partisan passions. Elsewhere, in that of our own field does not provide exception to this tendency.
 Of unequivocal importance, is the sheer fact of current continued physical proximity, as a dynamic and economic factor of great importance in itself, in the prolongation of transference effects. The flood of neurophysiological stimuli occasioned by the analyst’s presence causes an entirely different intrapsychic situation from the prevailing in is absence, regardless of how one conceptualizes the difference. Thus, the gradual ‘weaning’ to independence, through the reduction of hours, is very useful in many instances: In some, it may be that the dissolution of the transference (in a practical sense), if well analysed, occurs, as Macalpine suggests, only after regular vistas cease. There are a certain number of patients who will never show a terminal phase (or incipient adaptation to the idea of termination as a reality), without relatively arbitrary setting of a termination date. Even though it has been tendentiously misunderstood in one or two instances. That is to say, that a predismissed period of varying duration, following what would ordinarily be regarded as termination, be devoted to vis-à-vis interviews, at reduced frequency, dealing in integrated fashion with whatever preoccupations the patient is impelled to bring to such valedictory. The vis-à-vis element adds the further advantage of testing tenacious transference images against the actuality.
 The urge toward actual instinctual gratifications and allied satisfactions, the need to be rid of burdens of time and expense, the sheer urges toward independent functioning, often participate importantly in the dynamic of ultimately successful separation. Certainly, the analyst’s own nonarrogant but firm inaccessibility to residual transference wishes of the patient (however expressed), coupled with the conscious and unconscious wish to set him free for developments in his individual potentialities, also contributes to his important development.
 According to Freud's doctrine of infantile sexuality, adult sexuality is an end product of a complex process of development, beginning in childhood, involving a variety of body functions or areas (oral, anal, and genital zones), and corresponding to various stages in the relation of the child to adults, especially to parents. Of crucial importance is the so-called Oedipal period, occurring at about four to six years of age, because at this stage of development the child for the first time becomes capable of an emotional attachment to the parent of the opposite sex that is similar to the adult's relationship to a mate; the child simultaneously reacts as a rival to the parent of the same sex. Physical immaturity dooms the child's desires to frustration and his or her first step toward adulthood to failure. Intellectual immaturity further complicates the situation because it makes children afraid of their own fantasies. The extent to which the child overcomes these emotional upheavals and to which these attachments, fears, and fantasies continue to live on in the unconscious greatly influences later life, especially loves relationships.
The conflicts occurring in the earlier developmental stages are no less significant as a formative influence, because these problems represent the earliest prototypes of such basic human situations as dependency on others and relationship to authority. Also, basic in moulding the personality of the individual is the behavior of the parents toward the child during these stages of development. The fact that the child reacts, not only to objective reality, but also to fantasy distortions of reality, however, greatly complicates even the best-intentioned educational efforts.
 Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, one of the pioneers of having taken to exist by or modernized in times close to the present concepts of a possible nontraditional psychoanalysis, began his career working closely with the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud. However, Jung rejected his mentor’s belief that sexuality is the primary motivating factor in human behavior. Author Anthony Stevens explores Jung’s hypothesis of the collective unconscious, which asserts that human beings are born with certain inherited, rather than learned, modes of functioning. This concept led to a split with Freud and to the development of a new school of psychoanalysis.
 The ‘collective unconscious’, finds to itself the terminological maze of something intricately or confusingly elaborate or complicated, however, the  means through which the procedural struggle for justifying the  methodological claims that the ends amidst the generative measures that mean of a reconstruction of or relating to the mind, as the mental aspects of to the mind. That the mental expressions of the problem are the procedural measures in the series of actions, operations, or motions involve in the accomplishment of an end-product where something requiring thought and skill to arrive at a proper conclusion, that in psychology, it is meant by a shared pool of memories, ideas, and modes of thought. According to Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, it comes from the life experience of one's ancestors and from the entire human race. The collective unconscious coexists with the personal unconscious, which contains the material of individual experience, and may be regarded as an immense depository of ancient wisdom.
 `Primal experiences are represented in the collective unconscious by archetypes, symbolic pictures, or personifications that appear in dreams and are the common elements in myths, fairy tales, and religious literature. Examples include the serpent, the sphinx, the Great Mother, the anima (representing the nature of women), and the mandala (representing balanced wholeness, human or divine).
 From the start of psychoanalysis, Freud attracted followers, many of whom later proposed competing theories, as a group, these neo-Freudians shared the assumption that the unconscious plays an important role in a person’s thoughts and behaviours. To a larger extent, these analytical colleagues parted company with Freud, making straight over his emphasis on sex as a driving force. For example, Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung theorized that all humans inherit a collective unconscious that contains universal symbols and memories from their ancestral past. Austrian physician Alfred Adler theorized that people are primarily motivated to overcome inherent feelings of inferiority. He wrote about the effects of birth order in the family and coined the term sibling rivalry. Karen Horney, a German-born American psychiatrist, argued that humans have basic needs for love and security, and become anxious when they feel isolated and alone.
 Unconscious, in the field of psychology, is termed to the hypothetical region of the mind containing wishes, memories, fears, feelings, and ideas that are prevented from expression in conscious awareness. They manifest themselves, instead, by their influence on conscious processes and, most strikingly, by such anomalous phenomena as dreams and neurotic symptoms. Not all mental activity of which the subject is unaware belongs to the unconscious; for example, thoughts that may be made conscious by a new focussing of attention are termed foreconscious or preconscious.
 The concept of the unconscious was first developed in the periods between 1895 to 1900 by Sigmund Freud, who theorized that it consists of survivals of feelings experienced during infantile life, including both instinctual drives or libido and their modifications by the development of the superego. According to the Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Jung, the unconscious also consists of a racial unconscious that contains certain inherited, universal, archaic fantasies belonging to what Jung termed the collective unconscious.
 Scientists have long considered the nature of consciousness without producing a fully satisfactory definition. In the early 20th century American philosopher and psychologist William James suggested that consciousness is a mental process involving both attention to external stimuli and short-term memory. Later scientific explorations of consciousness mostly expanded upon James’s work. In the article from a 1997 special issue of Scientific American, Nobel laureate Francis Crick, who helped determine the structure of DNA, and fellow biophysicists Christof Koch explains how experiments on vision might deepen our understanding of consciousness.
 From the start of psychoanalysis, Freud attracted followers, many of whom later proposed competing theories, but as a group or a binding amalgamation of psychoanalytic colleagues, these neo-Freudians shared the speculative assumptions that the unconscious plays an important role in a person’s thoughts and behaviours, however, in the parting company with Freud, however, over his emphasis on sex as a driving force. For example, Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung theorized that all humans inherit a collective unconscious that contains universal symbols and memories from their ancestral past. Austrian physician Alfred Adler theorized that people are primarily motivated to overcome inherent feelings of inferiority. He wrote about the effects of birth order in the family and coined the term sibling rivalry. Karen Horney, a German-born American psychiatrist, argued that humans have basic needs for love and security, and become anxious when they feel isolated and alone.
 Motivated by a desire to uncover unconscious aspects of the psyche, psychoanalytic researchers devised what is known as projective tests. A projective test asks people to respond to an ambiguous stimulus such as a word, an incomplete sentence, an inkblot, or an ambiguous picture. These tests are based on the assumption that if a stimulus is vague enough to accommodate different interpretations, then people will use it to project their unconscious needs, wishes, fears, and conflicts. The most popular of these tests are the Rorschach Inkblot Test, which consists of ten inkblots, and the Thematic Apperception Test, which consists of drawings of people in ambiguous situations.
 Psychoanalysis has been criticized on various grounds and is not as popular as in the past. However, Freud’s overall influence on the field has been deep and lasting, particularly his ideas about the unconscious. Today, most psychologists agree that people can be profoundly influenced by unconscious forces, and that people often have a limited awareness of why they think, feel, and behave as they do
 In addition to Wundt, James, and Freud, and many others’ scholars helped to define the science of psychology. In 1885 German philosopher Hermann Ebbinghaus conducted a series of classic experiments on memory, using nonsense syllables to establish principles of retention and forgetting. In 1896 American psychologist Lightner Witmer opened the first psychological clinic, which initially treated children with learning disorders. He later founded the first journal and training program in a new helping profession that he named clinical psychology. In 1905 French psychologist Alfred Binet devised the first major intelligence test in order to assess the academic potential of schoolchildren in Paris. The test was later translated and revised by Stanford University psychologist Lewis Terman and is now known as the Stanford-Binet intelligence test. In 1908 American psychologist Margaret Floy Washburn (who for the reasons became the second female president of the American Psychological Association) wrote an influential book called The Animal Mind, in which she synthesized animal research to that time.
 States of consciousness are no simple, agreed-upon definition of consciousness exists. Attempted definitions tend to be tautological (for example, consciousness defined as awareness) or merely descriptive (for example, consciousness described as sensations, thoughts, or feelings). Despite this problem of definition, the subject of consciousness has had a remarkable history. At one time the primary subject matter of psychology, consciousness as an area of study suffered an almost total termination, later reemerging to become a topic of current interest
 Most of the philosophical discussions of consciousness arose from the mind-body issues posed by the French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes in the 17th century. Descartes asked: Is the mind, or consciousness, independent of matter? Is consciousness extended (physical) or unextended (nonphysical)? Is consciousness determinative, or is it determined? English philosophers such as John Locke equated consciousness with physical sensations and the information they provide, whereas European philosophers such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Immanuel Kant gave a more central and active role to consciousness.
 The philosopher who most directly influenced subsequent exploration of the subject of consciousness was the 19th-century German educator Johann Friedrich Herbart, who wrote that ideas had quality and intensity and that they may inhibit or facilitate one and the other. Thus, ideas may pass from “states of reality” (consciousness) to “states of tendencies” (unconsciousness), with the dividing line between the two states being described as the threshold of consciousness. This formulation of Herbart clearly presages the development, by the German psychologist and physiologist Gustav Theodor Fechner, of the psychophysical measurement of sensation thresholds, and the later development by Sigmund Freud of the concept of the unconscious.
 The experimental analysis of consciousness dates from 1879, when the German psychologist Wilhelm Max Wundt started his research laboratory. For Wundt, the task of psychology was the study of the structure of consciousness, which extended well beyond sensations and included feelings, images, memory, attention, duration, and movement. Because early interest focussed on the content and dynamics of consciousness, it is not surprising that the central methodology of such studies was introspection; that is, subjects reported on the mental contents of their own consciousness. This introspective approach was developed most fully by the American psychologist Edward Bradford Titchener at Cornell University. Setting his task as that of describing the structure of the mind, Titchener attempted to detail, from introspective self-reports, the dimensions of the elements of consciousness. For example, taste was “dimensionalized” into four basic categories: sweet, sour, salt, and bitter. This approach was known as structuralism.
 By the 1920s, however, a remarkable revolution had occurred in psychology that was to essentially remove considerations of consciousness from psychological research for some 50 years: Behaviourism captured the field of psychology. The main initiator of this movement was the American psychologist John Broadus Watson. In a 1913 article, Watson stated, “I believe that we can write if a psychological science and never use the term’s consciousness, mental states, mind . . . imagery and the like.” Psychologists then turned almost exclusively to behavior, as described in terms of stimulus and response, and consciousness was totally bypassed as a subject. A survey of eight leading introductory psychology texts published between 1930 and the 1950s found no mention of the topic of consciousness in five texts, and in two it was treated as a historical curiosity.
 As the concept of a direct, simple linkage between environment and behavior became unsatisfactory in recent decades, the interest in altered states of consciousness may be taken as a visible sign of renewed interest in the topic of consciousness. That persons are active and intervening participants in their behavior has become increasingly clear. Environments, rewards, and punishments are not simply defined by their physical character. Memories are organized, not simply stored, that of an entirely new area called cognitive psychology has emerged that centre on these concerns. In the study of children, increased attention is being paid to how they understand, or perceive, the world at different ages. In the field of animal behavior, researchers increasingly emphasize the inherent characteristics resulting from the way a species has been shaped to respond adaptively to the environment. Humanistic psychologists, with a concern for self-actualization and growth, have emerged after a long period of silence. Throughout the development of clinical and industrial psychology, the conscious states of persons in terms of their current feelings and thoughts were of obvious importance. The role of consciousness, however, was often de-emphasised in favour of unconscious needs and motivations. Trends can be seen, however, toward a new emphasis on the nature of states of consciousness.
 The overwhelming question in neurobiology today is the relation between the mind and the brain. Everyone agrees that what we know as mind is closely related to certain aspects of the behavior of the brain, not to the heart, as Aristotle thought. Its most mysterious aspect is consciousness or awareness, which can take many forms, from the experience of pain to self-consciousness. In the past the mind (or soul) was often regarded, as it was by Descartes, as something immaterial, separate from the brain but interacting with it in some way. A few neuroscientists, such as Sir John Eccles, still assert that the soul is distinct from the body. But most neuroscientists now believe that all aspects of mind, including its most puzzling attribute - consciousness or awareness - are likely to be explainable in a more materialistic way as the behavior of large sets of interacting neurons. As William James, the father of American psychology, said a century ago, consciousness is not a thing but a process
 Jung created a school of psychology that he called analytical psychology. He felt that Freud focussed too much on sexual drives and not enough on all of the creative instincts and impulses that motivate individuals. Whereas Freud had described the personal unconscious, which reflected the sum of one person’s experience, Jung added the concept of the collective unconscious, which he defined as the reservoir of the experience of the entire human race. The collective unconscious contains images called archetypes that are common to all individuals. They are often expressed in mythological concepts such as good and evil spirits, fairies, dragons, and gods.
 In general, Jungian therapists see psychological problems as arising from unconscious conflicts that create disturbances in psychic energy. They treat psychological problems by helping their patients bring material from their personal and collective unconscious into conscious awareness. The therapists do this through a knowledge of symbolism - not only symbols from mythology and folk culture, but also current cultural symbols. By interpreting dreams and other materials, Jungian therapists help their patients become more aware of unconscious processes and become stronger individuals.
 In his analysis of individual development, Adler stressed the sense of inferiority, rather than sexual drives, as the motivating force in human life. According to Adler, conscious or subconscious feelings of inferiority (to which he gave the name inferiority complex), combined with compensatory defence mechanisms, is the basic cause of psychopathological behavior. The function of the psychoanalyst, furthermore, is to discover and rationalize such feelings and break down the compensatory, neurotic will for power that they engender in the patient. Adler's works include The Theory and Practice of Individual Psychology (1918) and The Pattern of Life (1930).
 A disciple of the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Green insisted that consciousness provides the necessary basis for both knowledge and morality. He argued that a person's highest good is the self-realization and that the individual can achieve a self-realization only in society. Society has an obligation, in turn, to provide for the good of all its members. The political implications of his philosophy laid the basis for sweeping social-reform legislation in Britain. In addition to being the most influential British philosopher of his time, Green was a vigorous champion of popular education, temperance, and political liberalism. His writings include Prolegomena to Ethics (1883) and Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (1895), where both were posthumously published.
 Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882), British philosopher and educator, who led the revolt against empiricism, the dominant philosophy in Britain during the latter part of the 19th century. He was born in Birkin, Yorkshire, England, and educated at Rugby and the University of Oxford. He taught at Oxford from 1860 until his death, initially as a fellow and after 1878 as Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy.
 In the psychoanalytic model, neurosis differs from the psychosis, another general term used to describe mental illnesses. Individuals with neuroses can function at work and in social situations, whereas people with psychoses find it quite difficult to function adequately. People with neuroses do not grossly distort or misinterpret reality as those with psychoses do. In addition, neurotic individuals recognize that their mental functioning is disturbed while psychotic individuals usually do not. Most mental health professionals now use the term psychosis to call symptoms such hallucinations, delusions, and bizarre behaviour.
 The central positions for which are given in that mind, are that, only if to realize the important characterizations that move the charge from knowing that cognition, as an act or process of knowing, in that of cognition, which  includes attention, perception, memory, reasoning, judgment, imagining, thinking, and speech. Attempts to explain the way in which cognition works is old as philosophy itself; the term, in fact, comes from the writings of Plato and Aristotle. With the advent of psychology as some discipline separates from philosophy, cognition has been investigated from several viewpoints.
 An entire field - cognitive psychology has arisen since the 1950s. It studies cognition mainly from the standpoint of information handling. Parallels are stressed between the functions of the human brain and the computer concepts such as the coding, storing, retrieving, and buffering of information. The actual physiology of cognition is of little interest to cognitive psychologists, but their theoretical models of cognition have deepened understanding of memory, psycholinguistics, and the development of intelligence.
 Social psychologists since the mid-1960s have written extensively on the topic of cognitive consistency - that is, the tendency of a person's beliefs and actions to be logically consistent with one and the other. When cognitive dissonance, or the lack of such consistency, arises, the person unconsciously seeks to restore consistency by changing his or her behaviour, beliefs, or perceptions. The manner in which a particular individual classifies cognition in order to impose order has been termed cognitive style.
 Nevertheless, in 1886 Freud established a private practice in Vienna specializing in nervous disease. He met with violent opposition from the Viennese medical profession because of his strong support of Charcot’s unorthodox views on hysteria and Hypnotherapy. The resentment he incurred was to delay any acceptance of his subsequent findings on the origin of neurosis.
 Hypnotherapy, can be considered as an altered state of consciousness and heightened responsiveness to suggestion, it may be induced in normal persons by a variety of methods and has been used occasionally in medical and psychiatric treatment. Most frequently hypnosis is caused through the actions of an operator, the hypnotist, who engages the attention of a subject and assigns certain tasks to him or her while uttering monotonous, repetitive verbal commands; such tasks may include muscle relaxation, eye fixation, and arm levitation. Hypnosis also may be self-induced, by trained relaxation, concentration on one's own breathing, or by a variety of monotonous practices and rituals that are found in many mystical, philosophical, and religious systems.
 Hypnosis results in the gradual assumption by the subject of a state of consciousness in which attention is withdrawn from the outside world and is concentrated on mental, sensory, and physiological experiences. When a hypnotist induces a trance, a close relationship or rapport develops between operator and subject. The responses of subjects in the trance state, and the phenomena or behaviour they manifest objectively, are the product of their motivational set; that is, behaviour reflects what is being sought from the experience.
 Most people can be easily hypnotized, but the depth of the trance varies widely. A profound trance is characterized by a forgetting of trance events and by an ability to respond automatically to posthypnotic suggestions that are not too anxiety-provoking. The depth of an achievable trance is a relatively fixed characteristic, dependent on the emotional condition of the subject and on the skill of the hypnotist. Only 20 percent of subjects could enter somnambulistic states through the usual methods of induction. Medically, this percentage is not significant, since therapeutic effects occur even in a light trance.
 Hypnosis can produce a deeper contact with one's emotional life, resulting in some lifting of repressions and exposure of buried fears and conflicts. This effect potentially lends itself to medical and educational use, but it also lends itself to misinterpretation. Thus, the revival through hypnosis of early, forgotten memories may be fused with fantasies. Research into hypnotically induced memories in recent years has in fact stressed their uncertain reliability. Consequently several state court systems in the US have placed increasing constraints on the use of evidence hypnotically obtained from witnesses, although most states still permit its introduction in court.
 Hypnosis has been used to treat a variety of physiological and behavioural problems. It can alleviate back pain and pain resulting from burns and cancer. It has been used by some obstetricians as the sole analgesia for normal childbirth. Hypnosis is sometimes also employed to treat physical problems with a possible psychological component, such as Raynaud's syndrome (a circulatory disease) and faecal incontinence in children. Researchers have demonstrated that the benefit of hypnosis is greater than the effect of a placebo and probably results from changing the focus of attention. Few physicians, however, include hypnosis as part of their practice.
 Some behavioural difficulties, such as cigarette smoking, overeating, and insomnia, are also amenable to resolution through hypnosis. Nonetheless, most psychiatrists think that fundamental psychiatric illness is better treated with the patient in a normal state of consciousness.